


J X
1963
C735
1919
MAIN

UC-NRLF




B 2 755 655

YD 03168

GIFT OF

Author



EX LIBRIS

LIBRARY OF
GIFT
APR 1 1923

The Sole Condition of Permanent Peace



E. B. COPELAND



Chico, California, 1919

TO VINO
ALBINO

The Sole Condition of Permanent Peace

E. B. Copeland

Chico, California, 1919

ABORIGINAL

Gift of author

JX1963
C735
1919
MAIN

The Sole Condition of Permanent Peace

Rousseau thought it a great joke that, after the King of France failed in an attempt to insure general peace, the Abbe de St. Pierre tried to do the same thing by writing a book. The times have changed, and we can do many things beyond the power, and beyond the dreams, of any King of France. The publication of the personal ideas of St. Pierre, Penn, Kant and others was indeed rather futile; but the formulation by many men of the common ambition of most men must help our common aims grow into facts. The peoples of the larger part of the World now control their own political destinies. Very nearly all of the people of the World now want peace. The difference in the times is that the peace-wanters now rule. What the people of the World almost unanimously want, they can have, if they will. And the charge which the pacifists indignantly denied a couple of years ago, that they wanted peace at any price, lies against almost all of us by this time.

England and France have already invested a third of their national wealth in the struggle for peace, and after their good money and better blood, we are sending ours. So far as wealth is concerned, and life too, we are indeed for peace at any price; it is a carte blanche order. As is fitting in a carte blanche order, the specifications are fairly stringent. The peace for which we are paying whatever the price may turn out to be must be real, reasonable, and in prospect durable. A truce, or the mere form of peace, such "peace" as Europe had before it began to war openly, need not be tried again.

Because Germany, with her spies, her intrigue and mischief-making, her armament, and all the paraphernalia, accessories and consequences of her selfish and ambitious Weltpolitik, was chiefly responsible for the unreality of recent peace, because she constantly opposed efforts to approach real peace, because she precipitated the World war, regardless of treaties and of the whole

The Sole Condition of Permanent Peace.

body of international law to which she pretended to subscribe, because we are at war with her and could not, after the experience of Russia, have any sufficient way of recognizing an offer of peace with the Imperial German government, even when what might seem to be one was presented, and because parts of Europe are today without government which can be trusted to be responsible, for all of these reasons, we are agreed, among ourselves and with the rest of the extra-germanic World, in recognizing Germany, and the chaotic conditions of Germany and Russia, as the immediate obstacles to peace. Our immediate task, then, beside which all others are insignificant for the present, is to get rid of these obstacles. There is only one apparent way to do this, and that is by the maintenance of force so great and so persistent that it may not be resisted. This is the only pacifist policy there is, unless we are really ready to turn the other cheek; and even that alternative was never elaborated far enough to include directions after the head is cut off.

Sooner or later, the obstacles will be disposed of. In the meantime, not letting consideration of more remote aims distract efforts from the cremation of German and Bolshevik ambition, we may well take steps to establish a system of World politics which will make another great war unlikely or impossible.

In the first place, we need to formulate our agreement on the nature, terms and conditions of peace. The peace we and our allies aspire to must be satisfactory to as large a part of humanity as any one set of terms can satisfy. It must be founded on terms likely to become more satisfactory as time passes. It must be on terms adjusted in advance to such economic, political and social progress as reasonably may be foreseen, and permitting further peaceful adjustment of the same kind. It must be as just as possible and as permanent as possible. These basic, general considerations must underly and take precedence of any efforts to guard the interests and aspirations of single groups of people, even groups of considerable size. If we make the conservation of the interests, aspirations or several supposed rights of many races and nations the chief consideration in arranging conditions of peace, we will thereby conserve the sole probable cause of war. Recognition of this fact does not impair the justice of our cause in this war, any more than it does the justice of Belgium's position. But it is a fact which must have its share of attention when we undertake to provide real and permanent peace.

The Sole Condition of Permanent Peace.

There are two historical facts of especial significance in any attempt to devise conditions of lasting peace. The first is that, within limits fixed primarily by the effectiveness of means of travel and communication, and only secondarily by differences in race, language, religion and customs, internal peace has been easier to maintain than external peace. Empires have broken up under attack from without, but never from internal causes independent of the difficulty of communication; and difficulty of this kind hardly survives at all. The stability of the British Empire proves that there is no longer a limit to the size of empires internally secure. If Russia had been for a decade a part of the British Empire or of the United States, she would never have collapsed. The most important move of our allies since the war began has been unification of counsel and effort.

The second of these historic facts, or perhaps only a corollary of the first, is that the number of independent states tends to diminish. Within our own times, some states, previously really independent, have been absorbed and assimilated, others have lost nominal independence, and still others have been reduced to the latter condition; while no state has acquired real independence within forty years, unless Norway did so by acquiring a king in severalty. The disappearance of independent states may be by conquest, as in the case of the Transvaal, or due to the obvious futility of resistance, as in the case of Korea, or by choice, as by the request of Hawaii. What of the changes brought by this war, such as the overrunning of Montenegro and the establishment of Ukrainia, will survive the war, is uncertain. But there is no reason to doubt at all that the tendency of small states to be merged into greater ones will continue, while small states remain available.

There is likewise no evident reason to anticipate that states so situated that one can war on another, with hope of advantage in either direction, will ever abstain through great periods of time from doing so. A part of the causes of past wars are certainly disappearing; but the interests of nations will be able to conflict as long as the nations survive, and it is hard to imagine any complete scheme by which conflicting interests of independent and coordinate states can be kept from occasionally being settled by the test of war.

Still another practical certainly, to which we may not close our eyes, is the fact that if wars recur they cannot always be restricted in violence or savagery. Rules may govern the back-yard rows of

The Sole Condition of Permanent Peace.

little powers, afraid to offend the sentiment of a neutral world which might suppress them; but in a world-war, like the present one, the only limits to be trusted are the temporary limitations of the destructive power of science. While war goes on, the science of destruction speeds up, at the same time that the decent sentiments which tend to hold control in peace are gradually crushed out. The World was horrified beyond its worst dream in 1914; and that was before poisonous gases were used, before neutral women and children were deliberately drowned at sea, before nurses were murdered and before hospitals began to be sought out for bombing. We have no substantial basis for hope that, if conditions for another World war are permitted to mature, the horrors will not be far worse. Methods of far more wholesale slaughter are already almost within reach. How can we sanely doubt that on occasion those who can will use them? Extermination has been practiced in the past, even by those from whom we derive our religion. It has been attempted in the present war, and not in Serbia and Armenia alone; "bleeding France white" means as nearly that as it can.

The recent unbridled tumult in Petrograd and Odessa was graphically described by Thucydides, who staged it at Corcyra. The next presentation may be in Constantinople, or Vienna, or Essen. Human nature is exceedingly slow to change. It simply can not be relied upon, independently of restraint, to guard real or lasting peace, or even to prevent future wars far more terrible than the present one. The only hope lies in authority. And this authority, while it might conceivably rest on a religious basis, or on human reason, striving to escape from the evil of war, must in practice,—if past and present lessons have any practical value at all,—be established and for some time be maintained by adequate power.

There have been many attempts to outline, and a number to secure, the political machinery necessary for the thorough establishment of peace. In the ancient World, the spread of Roman dominion well over the whole area of contact and communication reduced foreign relations to such relative unimportance that for a long time the Roman World enjoyed practical peace. Universality was an early and lasting hope of the Christian church, which was fused with the Roman tradition of temporal power to preserve the Holy Roman Empire through the middle ages.

The first comprehensive plan to insure the peace of modern

The Sole Condition of Permanent Peace.

Europe was the Grand Design of Henry IV of France, said to have been suggested to him by Elizabeth. By the execution of this plan, Europe would have formed a sort of federation, governed by a president and a council or senate, to be composed of four representatives from each major power and two from each minor state. While Henry's plan would have made the Hapsburg emperor the first head of the new over-state, it would have destroyed all claim to permanent imperial sovereignty, which fact, according to an intimation of Penn, was responsible for his murder.

Penn's scheme, designed to give Europe a chance to heal herself from the wars of the end of the seventeenth century, proposed a "European Sovereign, or Imperial diet, Parliament, or Estates," representation in which was to be in proportion to ability to support its financial burdens. "But for example's sake," Penn suggested that of the delegates, "The Empire of Germany send twelve; France, ten; Spain, ten; Italy, which comes to France, eight; England, six;" etc., ninety in all. The advantages expected to result were: The saving of blood, which "recommends our expedient beyond all objections;" the enhanced reputation of Christianity; the saving of money; the preservation of towns, cities and countries; peace and security of travel and traffic; protection against the Turk (who was to be invited in, with ten delegates); the enhancement of personal friendship between princes and states; and a chance for princes to "choose wives for themselves such as they love, and not by proxy merely to gratify interest."

The Abbe de St. Pierre published a few years later the 'Project of a treaty to make peace perpetual,' a less comprehensive scheme than Penn's, but more widely known, and of importance particularly because its suggestions reappeared in the organization of the Holy Alliance.

The condition of Europe just over a century ago is reproduced in essentials with singular fidelity today. The outstanding feature of the time was exhaustion, of men and resources, until the ambition for glory, and even the hope of gain or power, were giving way to sickness of war and hope of peace. France then, like Germany in 1918, was holding at bay a world exasperated by her aggression, determined to reduce her at least to equality with other states, and too strong, in right and in might, permanently to be resisted. The parallel goes much farther; for example, to the similarity of position of Russia then and America now, with resources almost intact, and to Alexander's insistence that he was

The Sole Condition of Permanent Peace.

warring on Napoleon, but not on the French people; but it is sufficient to note that the conditions cogently moving men to seek the means of lasting peace were the same then as now.

A compact league of the European nations, having as its chief function the preservation of peace, was a life-long dream of the Emperor Alexander. As early as 1804, he made a definite proposition of this kind to England. The first treaty between a number of powers, giving definite expression to this idea, was that of Chaumont, dated in March, 1814, between Russia, Prussia, Austria and England, providing for war against Napoleon, and peace after his overthrow. By this treaty, each nation bound itself to be ready at any time during the anticipated peace to contribute a quota of sixty thousand men, to form a European army. The treaty of Paris, shortly afterward, was signed also by France, Spain, Portugal and Sweden, but these powers were never admitted to the inner circle of leaders.

The Congress of Vienna, anathematized of late as history's choicest demonstration of unprincipled national selfishness, was called in the name of peace and justice, and as honestly, on the part of many of the participants or attendants, as any congress of many peoples can be expected to be called, to provide and ensure these ends. Far as it came from providing justice to all of Europe, it and the succeeding meetings and treaties at Paris, Aix-la-Chapelle, etc., did still, in the Holy Alliance and the more comprehensive leagues of the same years, provide for permanence of peace, as earnestly and in as proper form as could be hoped for in any first attempt on a large scale. The act of the Holy Alliance provided that: "The sole principle of force, whether between the said Governments or between their subjects, shall be that of doing each other reciprocal service, and of testifying by unalterable good will the mutual affection with which they ought to be animated, to consider themselves all as members of one and the same Christian nation" (Quoted From Phillips: *The Confederation of Europe*, p. 302).

From the final breaking down of this group of leagues, their failure to provide permanent peace, and the flagrant injustice which characterized their temporary effectiveness, it has been usual to conclude that such attempts are foredoomed to failure. It is undoubtedly true that the alliances of a century ago could not have accomplished their full professed aims. It may be granted too that no political device could then have realized Alexander's

The Sole Condition of Permanent Peace.

dream of peace. But the failures, both of realization and of possibility, were for perfectly definite reasons. None of the causes of failure pass our power of definite understanding, and none of them pass our present power of remedy, if only we will agree to use our present power.

The efforts to realize general and lasting peace and justice, a century ago, failed because:

1. The spirit of nationalism and of pride in national sovereignty stood in the way.
2. The political and social differences between the several nations were too great to admit of their uniform control.
3. All of the attempted leagues were between rulers, the people being recognized as beneficiaries but never as participants.
4. No attempted league went far enough in its practical aims to make permanence possible, even if desirable.

1. Pride in one's political organization, and the enjoyment of this pride, are pure products of education; any form of hostility to the members of other political entities, as such, is bad fruit of the same tree. Patriotism has served human progress, sometimes with great effect, and will never lose its value, but it is not in itself more than a means to an end. It is good, in that it contributes to personal and social welfare, and not otherwise. It is one spirit, whatever its object of devotion,—town, city, state or nation. Devotion to one of these does not exclude devotion to the others; the best citizen of the state is the best citizen of his town also. Devotion to all of these is good, and the more active it is the better. Every political entity furnishes a point of application, inviting social effort. We derive happiness from our particular political associations, and they are responsible for much of our welfare; but it is only reasonable to remember that other political institutions might promote our welfare as effectively, and that the happiness which spurs and rewards our devotion is absolutely dependent on our individual circumstances. My brother loves Colorado, in a way quite strange to me, but is oddly unable to appreciate the glory of California.

The point of this is that any material change in the World's political organization must in its inception be somewhat uncomfortable to many people, simply because it is an innovation something they are not used to, because it will take, or seem to take, something away from the political organizations they are used

The Sole Condition of Permanent Peace.

to cherishing. We would outgrow this discomfort with time, and our children would accept the new order, as that of nature, just as we do that to which we were brought up. And the provision of the most satisfactory conditions for our children is the real end of all our efforts.

Race feelings, in distinction to national feelings, are to some extent innate, not the fruit of education alone. But they can be developed, or practically suppressed, by education. During the greater part of the history of the United States, England was the bete noir of most Americans, in spite of the racial identity of the two peoples. Most racial likes and antipathies which attract attention, far from being innate, are of quite quick growth, and are easily outgrown. Acquaintance usually does away with the most instinctive racial antipathies. Race pride is valuable when it is a spur to good work. It is a nuisance when it leads to refusal to accept good things from other races. The most rapid development of racial welfare results from the freest assimilation of whatever is good. If at the same time it is possible to effectually regulate borrowing, by such education in mutual ideas and institutions as will promote the general understanding of their effects, so much the better. The World Over-state should accomplish both of these general services.

Nothing of value in racial or national characteristics, present or future, needs to be sacrificed to the creation of the over-state. Cases will undoubtedly arise in time, in which locally cherished customs will be suppressed, in favor of others much more generally adhered to; slavery and polygamy have been handled in this way in the United States. Such interference is always cautious, never occurring except in consequence of very general conviction that the custom condemned is essentially bad. A mere majority of sentiment can never get a majority vote for interference. In its early years, a new over-state would presumably be especially careful not to interfere with matters of domestic concern to the constituent states; and after the period of its newness, such caution surely would not be abandoned any faster than confidence in the propriety of the state's actions can replace it, in avoiding danger of dissatisfaction.

National sovereignty would have to be sacrificed to the establishment of an over-state, if it really existed. But the fact is that no such thing is now recognized, except in forms of speech, and that hardly anybody believes it to exist. The last great states to

The Sole Condition of Permanent Peace.

claim it, except in verbal form, were China and Japan, both of which long since abandoned the claim. Imperial Germany has acted like a sovereign state, but still dared not claim real sovereignty; and not even Germany's own people, while they fought for her, relished or approved her disregard of treaties. Every item of recognized international law is a limitation on the sovereignty of the several nations, and every treaty further clouds the title of the participants. If the sacrifice of sovereignty is in itself bad, the evil must inhere also in treaties, particularly in treaties of alliance and treaties involving concessions, as practically all treaties do; while international law is worse, because it imposes an ill-defined cloud on every state's title to sovereignty. Every patriot who believes in treaties and in their observance should welcome an over-state, able to standardize treaties by incorporating them in general laws, to construe them with authority, and to guarantee their observance, and to substitute definite laws, with explicit sanctions, for the present body of unsanctioned and disputed international law.

We may conclude, then, that there is no national sovereignty, to be given up when an over-state is formed. There will be a loss of some of the authority now exercised by the several nations, but this loss, being mutual, and always in favor of the other states enduring the same sacrifice at the same time, must as an average be exactly compensated, even while the loss occurs. It depends only on care in organization, to see that the average is not reached by balancing big sacrifices against big gains by other powers. This should be almost automatic. The real sovereignty of the present states is in proportion to their might, and the great states would enter the World-state with more or less correspondingly great voting power. The kings and emperors, big and little, of Napoleon's time treated their sovereignty as something real. This compelled the great ones to treat many of the little ones as their equals, in form; but in practice the great ones refused to admit the minor ones to their more important meetings. With the great kings granting to the little kings the claim of equality, but refusing to make the claim effective, the attempt to create a real or durable confederation of Europe had to fail. Today the situation is very essentially different. The Englishman and Belgian recognize each other as equals, and will be satisfied if they are equally potent in shaping their joint and several political destinies. The representation of England and Belgium in the World-state's government can

The Sole Condition of Permanent Peace.

and must adjust itself mechanically. The executive personnel could just now be chosen with little friction. America is glad to have her soldiers commanded by an able French general, without waiting for the organization of an over-state.

There was, a century ago, no well developed national feeling in the great states of Eastern and Central Europe, and the rise of such a feeling in England and France was a chief obstacle to Alexander's federation. England chose deliberately to "revolve in her own orbit." The spirit of nationalism has grown in strength, but the whole World knows now that the orbits overlap and are entangled. The freest revolution of each people in its own orbit can be hoped for only by regulation competent to distribute and minimize the friction. Treaties adjust the integration of single wheels, and that only while they are observed. Only an over-state, with really sovereign authority, can regulate the whole World's political organization. Well handled, it can promote, instead of hamper, each people's freedom of revolution, and evolution.

2. The parties to the peace efforts of a century ago clearly understood that some measure of political uniformity was essential in the states uniting in any cohesive league. The Emperor Alexander even gave clear expression to his appreciation of the fact that his league might for this reason be made an instrument of tyranny,—as actually happened in its later days. Any state must guarantee some measure of stability to its constituents, against internal as well as against external enemies; and if the several constituent states be organized on too different principles, there will be too great difference of opinion, as to what constitutes an internal enemy, to make cohesion possible. The other great continental powers insisted on the reestablishment of a monarchy in France, before they would consider admitting her to their concert; and the first crises of their league arose over revolutions in Spain, Naples and Greece. The difference in the practice of government between England and her allies was largely responsible for England's refusal to join the Holy Alliance, although it was not until years later that the British ministry became legally responsible to the people or to their chosen representatives.

The present war is a conclusive demonstration of the incompatibility of too different government. Whether or not we are at war with the German people, we certainly would never have had to go to war if they had had our kind of government. The nations of the World cannot live together, half monarchical-aristo-

The Sole Condition of Permanent Peace.

cratic and half free. The monarchs of Russia, Austria and Prussia knew this, when they reestablished kings in Spain, France and Naples, and recently insisted on one for Norway. The proposition that Germany's form of government is none of our business is directly contrary to fact. Germany's form of government, not merely the personality of her rulers, has made her a World menace, and we will be well within our evident rights in insisting that she adopt a form of government that will make her a safe neighbor. The necessary measure of uniformity is realized by making government responsible to the people, subject to their sanction without appeal to violence, and, at least in effect, by their chosen agents. These demands are practically met already by every important power in the World, except Germany, Austria and Turkey. In this respect, then, the conditions working against the confederation of Europe a century ago have been very generally outgrown, and the change should be complete when this war is formally ended.

Too great compulsory uniformity is undesirable. It would be sure to stand in the way of progress; and, however well our various forms and degrees of popular government may satisfy us, we have no reason to suppose that our descendants in another century will not have outgrown them. The over-state should be plastic enough to permit progress, regulating it only so far as to make it orderly, without occasion for the destructive revolutions which have sometimes been among its features.

3. A league of sovereign rulers, guaranteeing internal stability to the constituent states, had in the nature of the case to oppose progress toward political liberality. This was exactly the operation of the Holy Alliance, the last work of which was Russian interference to crush a liberal movement in Hungary. The tendency of government in Europe a century ago, as in all the World now, was toward popular government, and a league standing against this movement had eventually to fail. The future over-state will be a union of peoples, not of ruling individuals or classes. The heads of states, even where there are hereditary limited monarchies, will necessarily reflect and assist in popular progress. This obstacle to the success of a World state has been outgrown, very completely.

4. As has just been indicated, the aims of the old European leagues, in that they undertook to conserve institutions in defiance of progress, made the endurance of the leagues impossible. Beyond not standing in the way of progress, and beyond being itself a step

The Sole Condition of Permanent Peace.

in progress, a general league capable of enduring must constitutionally favor progress. The recognized aim of government is now the welfare of the people; the only differences of opinion are as to what constitutes welfare and how it may best be promoted. While old attempts at confederation professed to seek the welfare of the people, these professions were too largely verbal; there were no specific attempts to promote it (aside from abstaining or planning to abstain from war), no provision of political machinery for its promotion, no single joint efforts or agencies of any kind to favor it. The keeping of peace was certainly in the interest of the people, as well as of their rulers, but a single benefit, however great, is not sufficient service to make any general political establishment permanent. The new over-state will in practice as well as in profession aim at human improvement in any and every practicable way. It must be expected to escape the fate of previous leagues, by **earning** permanence. Social improvement must be one of its outstanding activities.

From the study of the causes of failure of the peace efforts at the close of the Napoleonic era, we conclude, then, that an important part of these causes no longer exist; and that so far as conditions which might make a permanent league or union difficult have not been outgrown, they can be made inoperative, or converted into factors contributing to the success of an over-state, by the exercise of judgment in the formation and operation of the union. The same, and only these, general reasons are advanced in discouragement of similar efforts to-day.

Prior to the war, the most notable recent attempts to insure World peace were those associated with and growing out of the Hague conferences and tribunal. These resulted in real progress toward a recognized code of international law, but failed essentially when the control of policy was attempted. The basic difficulty of the entire Hague undertaking was lack of authority, with the necessary backing of power or force. This fact is not less clear and significant because the state which led in refusal to limit armaments and to require arbitration was the one which eventually wrecked the whole effort to preserve peace. A court without the power to enforce its decisions must always fail when it is most needed. In time of peace, before it was generally suspected that our whole civilization was in danger from lack of control of World politics, there seemed to be a fair chance that the Hague conferences and tribunal would serve as a nucleus, around which addi-

The Sole Condition of Permanent Peace.

tional political structures would grow up as their need might be felt. We know better now.

A firm league for the suppression of German violence already exists. As it has advanced from a mere alliance to a league, with centralized military authority, it has gained conspicuously in effectiveness. Under the stress of war, the necessity of close concert makes such a league effective, but in the safety of peace it presently disintegrates. The Grand Alliance suppressed Napoleon, but fell apart when it had no common enemy. A very much more complete union is wanted now. The words, alliance, league, confederation or confederacy and union, denote degrees of fusion in purpose and political form. The distinction between a confederation and a union, and the positive advantages of the union, were elaborated in theory and on the basis of experience with a confederation, by Hamilton and Madison, in the series of papers known collectively as the *Federalist*. Their arguments have lost nothing with time, and should be widely read and studied now. American experience with both confederation and union leaves no room for doubt, where it is understood, that for every function of a state, union is preferable to mere confederation. For the same reasons, either of these is more effective than such informal and transient associations as the alliance and league.

If stable peace were the only object of forming an over-state, it would have to have a well organized government, complete and powerful enough to command resources, test its own fairness, manage the World's armaments, and properly use them or hold them ready for use. These functions alone would require a real union. But the provision of stable peace will be far easier, surer and more economical, if the over-state is constituted with much broader powers and functions. It should obviously be able to regulate the conditions which without control may lead to dangerous rivalry, discord and enmity, and through these tend toward war.

While there remain no too serious general difficulties in the way of World confederation or union,—and this fact is evidenced by recent expressions of favorable attitude toward it in various lands,—conflicting interests of the various nations do remain, and these will arise as so many difficulties in detail, which will have to be overcome in order to secure the necessary hearty cooperation of the individual nations. The natural first positive step toward a union is the assembling of a preliminary congress, which will

The Sole Condition of Permanent Peace.

presumably deliberate for a considerable time, and in which the problems to be settled in the interest of the most general satisfaction will all be presented, and adjusted as well as possible. The most difficult problems will concern the scope of power of the central government, and the basis of representation. The latter question may arise even in the summoning or actions of the preliminary congress.

In some way, representation in the World government must of course be made a matter of mathematical determination. Even if it could be settled arbitrarily, by agreement, in the first place, no such agreement could be permanently satisfactory; and it is likely that whatever formula is adopted to determine representation will need to be modified in time. Alexander expected the existing states to enter his confederation as coordinate units; the great majority of the delegates to the Vienna Congress went with that idea, but the business there was all done by an inner circle of the great powers. Penn would apparently have made the basis of representation financial. It may safely be assumed that no single basis of representation,—present sovereignty, population, wealth or power,—will be satisfactory. Professor Laughlin, in the *Scientific Magazine* for December, 1916, suggests representation on the basis of population, literacy (share in the World's work), area in use, potentially useful area and international trade, to be weighted: potentially valuable area, 6%; area in use, 10%; total population, 10%; literate population, 25%; and foreign commerce, 50%. He also touches on the especially difficult problem of representation of or because of dependencies. It would seem better to base representation in part directly on national wealth, and to cut down materially the allotment to foreign commerce. While any discussion of these details is needless here, two observations will suggest the relation between the functions of the over-state and the composition of the governing body.

If a chief service of a confederacy is the protection of its constituents in their external commerce, and if its revenues are largely derived, directly or indirectly, from taxation of this commerce, these may be reasons for weighting it fairly heavily in making the formula by which representation is decided. Also, some weighing of international trade, independent of the extent to which the over-state may assume its control, is expedient, to encourage it for the mere sake of international intercourse.

For a similar reason, the proposition to weight trained popula-

The Sole Condition of Permanent Peace.

lation, rather than total population, is a good one; a settled formula with this feature will tend powerfully to make every state train its citizens. Beyond such encouragement, the over-state should make the training of the people one of its direct functions. The time is probably not far off when education will be the most important single function of every state. Germany's demonstration of what can be accomplished by misdirected education is far more than sufficient proof that once an over-state is established, and given a chance to use education properly on a World scale, the difficulties which may attend its foundation will be safely and very definitely passed.

The general idea of World union is so sound, the advantages of union so overwhelmingly exceed the difficulties, and appreciation of these facts is already so general, that some kind of World union is almost sure to result from the present conflict. It may come before or after a treaty of peace. It might well have come even before an armistice. In fixing the time which would be best, the determining consideration is the probable effect of union in permanent form on the consummation of immediate peace. If the difficulties in detail, which are likely to arise when formal union is undertaken, are serious enough to be likely to lead to serious discord, the attempt may be allowed to await the signing of treaties; peace has to be won before it is made permanent. But if the free nations of the World are agreed that the most perfect harmony of effort is needed to make complete victory certain, then objections that might seem serious to individual states at another time may be allowed to sleep, for the sake of the more urgent advantages of union; and if objections sleep, they are likely not to awaken.

There is no doubt at all that, once in operation, a union can wage war or make peace more effectively than can a group of allies. This is not alone because of the value of general martial unity, and unity of financial effort. The provision of food and other supplies to our allied armies and the people behind them has improved in efficiency as control has been centralized, and could surely be made more perfect under permanent supreme authority. But the greatest value to be realized from union, since we already have a measure of some of its advantages in centralized generalship and financial policy, would be psychological. Union in definite form would remove any suspicion anywhere that the armies of freedom may be inadequate, any lurking fear that, with the collapse of the German Empire, an end may come to their support; it would

The Sole Condition of Permanent Peace.

end all danger of a peace by compromise, leaving intrigue, faithlessness and the ambition of single men free to prepare again; it would fuse and enthuse our armies, in a way beyond the reach of mere unity of plan and command.

If we had been one union, German propaganda would have had a different chance in Russia. The same condition would dispose of Bolshevik propaganda now. A union of peoples could hardly have included old Russia, but Russia after the first revolution would have been perfectly at home in it. That milk was spilt, but there is more in Russia. German and Bolshevik intrigue elsewhere would be nullified by prompt union. The Orient has been hardly more than nominally in the war, and has had some excuse if it saw a limited reason for great exertion. But China would be prompt to see salvation in World union, and could become a willing and potent factor in guarding peace. Japan has not China's need of protection by union, but is wise enough to prefer security in eventual enduring peace to safety at the cost of constant readiness for war. Her past policies have been distinctly of the German type, and have had to be, to make her safe. Remodel World politics, so that her own might in war is not needed to insure her survival and progress, and no people will find more relief in disarmament.

One of the greatest reasons for promptness of union is its effect on Germany. Her people would have nothing left to fight for or to wrangle over. Even if she has hoped to conquer the World piece-meal, she could have no hope of conquering, or even resisting it, permanently united. To stage a series of revolutions while she gropes for terms, just as to go on fighting in the hope of a draw, would be to court final peaceful isolation, with no further prospect than accelerated relapse into complete helplessness. Richly as Germany has earned punishment, and bitter against her as the allied peoples properly are, none of them will balk at a treaty without revenge (in distinction, of course, to restitution), whenever peace can be trusted. The German war-lords had abundant selfish reason to oppose World union of peoples, but the German people have none; and German business interests, without the support of which the war party would always have been helpless, are already hunting for any cover, faced by a loosely united World. The German people could not refuse an opportunity to enter a union,—as France entered the European concert after the Napoleonic wars. To refuse Germany a chance to enter, even as a democracy, would

The Sole Condition of Permanent Peace.

justify the claim of her rulers, that she had to fight for a place in the sun. Offer her admittance on the same terms as other peoples, so far as her own proper soil and people are concerned, and this excuse vanishes. And the German people are weary enough to jump at the opportunity. Relieve her of even the chance to be crushed by her own armament, and the Germans will have a better place than their past or present prospects let them hope for.

For the allies, victorious as they definitely are, the war is at best only in its last stage; it is not finished. It is true that a succession of skilful extensions of an armistice originally thorough in its provisions is making it impossible for any German government to think of returning to arms. But beside more or less difficult details to be settled, we have still to provide for the fulfillment of the terms of whatever treaty may be imposed on Germany, and to guard against both anarchy and the spread of class tyranny. Germany can never pay for the damage she has wrought. Whatever bill for damage may be drawn up, the real tasks are deciding what can be collected and collecting it. A German government might be made to agree to almost anything, regardless of what it can deliver. We have no practical experience with national insolvency, and can have no confidence in anticipating its effects. But of these two facts we may be quite sure: That we will be in a better position to judge Germany's ability, and the quality of her efforts to pay, and much better able to assist or compel her to pay what she reasonably can, if she is under an over-state in which her creditors have the majority vote, than if she is left the form of sovereignty, so that supervision must be foreign in both form and fact; and that Germany's power to pay is further decreased by every internal revolution, outbreak or riot. For our own sakes, we must insure government in Germany. An over-state will provide an orderly method; without it, war will remain our only recourse.

Bolshevism is just as much the tyranny of a class as was German imperialism, and is an even more insidious menace to our democracy. It certainly does not represent any proper step in human progress. An over-state could prevent it, by guarding against the ignorance, misery and hopelessness which are responsible for it, and would have orderly and proper means of suppressing it where it already exists, in subordinate states, guaranteed the support of representative government. We know that it is a most dangerous neighbor, but do not know what to do with it in a foreign state. Form an over-state and the threat of it will vanish.

The Sole Condition of Permanent Peace.

The sole condition of permanent peace is World union. As the nations should unite, in order to secure the blessings of permanent peace, they should form a union **promptly**, in order to realize the prospect of **any** peace.



Pamphlet
Binder
Gaylord Bros.
Makers
Syracuse, N. Y.
PAT. JAN 21, 1908

U. C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES



C045593679

YD 03168

572072

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY

